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The Adequacy of the Oil Pollution
Act's Compensation Scheme in the
Case of a Catastrophic Oil Spill
I. INTRODUCTION
After fourteen years of attempts at comprehensive oil spill
legislation,' Congress claims a success with the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 (OPA) signed into law on August 18, 1990.2 The obvious
catalyst for passage of this legislation was the oil spill by the
super tanker Exxon Valdez in the Prince William Sound off the
coast of Alaska on March 24, 1989.
At the heart of OPA is the creation of an expanded oil spill
liability trust fund.3 The trust fund is generated by a five cents
per barrel tax on crude oil received at United States refineries,
and on any petroleum products entering the United States for
consumption, use, or warehousing. 4 The fund caps out at one
billion dollars5 and is to be utilized to pay removal costs incurred
by federal and state governments, 6 as well as claims made by
any "persons ' 7 for damages to natural resources, damages to
real or personal property, loss of subsistence, loss of revenues,
loss of profits, or costs incurred in providing additional public
services.8 The fund begins paying after the party responsible for
the spill has paid the full amount of its liability as set by the
OPA.9 The trustee of the fund is authorized to pay the full one
billion dollars on any single incident. 0
135 CoNG. REc. H7962 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lent).
Grumbles, Major Provisions, Themes of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 21 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) No. 27, at 1266 (Nov. 2, 1990).
3 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (West Supp. 1991) as amended by the OPA.
4 26 U.S.C.A. § 4611(a)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 1991) as amended by the OPA.
26 U.S.C.A. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1012(a)(2), 104 Stat. 484,
498, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
OPA § 1002(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
OPA § 1002(2)(A)-(F), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(2)(A)-(F) (West Supp. 1991)..
OPA § 1004, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (West Supp. 1991).
26 U.S.C.A. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
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The whole scheme sounds neat and easy, until one considers
that the cleanup costs alone for the Valdez spill are estimated
to be well over two billion dollars."t These cleanup costs have
been, and will continue to be, incurred by various state and
federal agencies. Suits brought against Exxon for oil damages
could produce claims exceeding even these cleanup costs. How,
then, can this new legislation be adequate when its payment
scheme seems only to contemplate spills that at most result in
damages of one billion dollars?
The purpose of this note is to consider how all injured parties
could have been compensated had OPA been in effect at the
time of the Valdez spill. The question sought to be answered is
whether this new "landmark law' ' l2 does in fact provide an
adequate compensation scheme in the event of a catastrophic oil
spill.
II. RECOVERY BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Under OPA, the federal government has exclusive authority
to direct oil spill cleanup operations. 3 The President directs how
and when the cleanup will proceed and who will carry it out.
4
Floor debate on this topic centered around the need to prevent
confusion and delay in the critical early stages of an oil spill. It
was generally felt that leaving a patchwork of state oil spill
response procedures in effect would only increase confusion of
the sort that delayed early response to the Valdez spill. 5 Allow-
ing the President complete control of cleanup operations was
meant to alleviate this sort of confusion.'
6
Grumbles, supra note 2, at 1267.
Id. at 1264.
" Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380 § 4201(a), 104 Stat. 484, 523,
33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(a) (West Supp. 1991).0).
I Id.
s 135 CoNo. Rac. H8130 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hammersch-
midt). In the early hours after the Valdez spill, Exxon wanted to use chemical dispersants
which had to be applied immediately to be effective. A squabble ensued between the
EPA, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), and the State of
Alaska over the safety of these dispersants. The delay made it impossible to use the
dispersants at all. Exxon has sued the State of Alaska over the incident alleging that the
refusal to allow immediate use of the dispersants significantly increased the total cost of
the cleanup and therefore Exxon's liability. 135 CONG. REc. H7970 (daily ed. Nov. 2,
1989) (statement of Rep. Scheuer).
,1OPA § 4201(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(a) (West Supp. 1991), is an amendment to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act placing the responsibility for oil removal with
the President, to be carried out in accord with a national contingency plan that will be
formulated pursuant to the mandates of OPA.
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To allow state input in the cleanup process, a compromise
was reached allowing states to set standards defining when a
cleanup is complete. 7 However, it is the federal authority rather
than any state authority that has the final say as to when those
standards are met.'8
Under the OPA cleanup scheme, the expenditures by the
federal government in the event of a catastrophic oil spill most
likely will be substantial. The combination of this cost with the
cost of natural resource damage caused to federal lands' 9 would
mean that claims by the federal government alone could very
well take up the entire amount of the responsible party's liability
as determined by OPA. 0 The federal government's next step
would be to proceed against the oil spill trust fund. In the
Valdez spill, costs and damages to the federal government would
exhaust the fund without full reimbursement. Existing precedent
would suggest that once the federal government has exhausted
the trust fund it cannot proceed under different theories of law
to get additional compensation. Passage of OPA has done noth-
ing to alter this existing precedent.
The precursor to OPA was the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA).21 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and
Michigan,22 the Supreme Court ruled that the legislative intent
of FWPCA was to "establish an all-encompassing program of
water pollution regulation.' '23 This conclusion was reached by
the Court based largely on the floor debate of the bill where
congressman after congressman referred to the "comprehensive"
135 CoNG. REc. H8147 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Davis).
I ld. This compromise accommodated a view held by those that favored non-
preemption of state oil spill cleanup: that states should be allowed to clean up in a
manner that is satisfactory to the individual state.
'1 National lands damaged in the Valdez spill included Kenai Fjords National
Park, Katmai National Park and Preserve, Aniakchak National Monument and Preserve,
the Alaska Peninsula National Wildlife Refuge, the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife
Refuge, the Becharof National Wildlife Refuge, and the Kodiak National Wildlife
Refuge. United States v. Exxon Corp., Criminal No. A90-015 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1821 (D. Alaska Feb. 27, 1990) (Indictment).
Liability limits are determined by the gross tonnage of the vessel involved
pursuant to the formula in OPA § 1004, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (West Supp. 1991).
21 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1976).
- 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
" Id. at 318. Prior to this decision, several lower courts held that the federal
government's exclusive remedy in oil spill situations was the FWPCA. E.g., United
States v. M/V Big Sam, 454 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. La. 1978); In re Steuart Transp. Co.,
435 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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nature of the legislation.2 4 From the floor debate, the Court
construed a clear congressional intent that the FWPCA fully
occupy the field of water pollution liability. As a result, any
claimant who wanted a federal district court to apply federal
common law rather than FWPCA to expand the responsible
parties' liability was denied such relief. The Supreme Court
concluded that courts could not "attempt to improve on that
[comprehensive] program with federal common law.''2
If OPA is read in the same manner as FWPCA was construed
in City of Milwaukee, then the same conclusion must follow:
that OPA is all-encompassing in the specific field of oil spill
liability. As was the case with the floor debate for FWPCA, the
floor debate regarding OPA was replete with redundant excla-
mations of "comprehensive[ness]. ' 26 The obvious conclusion is
that the use of federal common law to recoup additional oil spill
cleanup and restoration costs would be precluded by the com-
prehensive nature of OPA.
This preclusion of other remedies includes attempts by the
federal government to recover under maritime tort law and under
the federal common law of nuisance, both of which have been
held applicable to oil spills in the past.27 It also prevents any
attempted recovery under section 407 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899,28 which has been used in modern times by the
City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 318.
I d. at 319; See Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971). It is
important to note that the Court specifically left states free to "adopt more stringent
limitations through state administrative processes" and state laws as applied to in-state
discharges. What was not allowed was for states to call on federal courts to apply
federal common law. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 328.
135 CONG. REc. S9690 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Baucus); 135
CoNG. REc. S10087 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Domanici); 135 CONG.
REc. H7894 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989) (statement of Rep. Quillon); 135 CoNo. REc.
H7955 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Jones); 135 CONG. REC. H8131 (daily
ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Shumway); 135 CONG. REc. H8285 (daily ed. Nov.
9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Snowe); 136 CONG. REc. S11536 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Mitchell); 136 CONG. REC. H6934 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Loweg). Compare the above cited floor debate with the legislative nose-counting
by the Court in City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317-319 and 329-332.
1 California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 339 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1964); In re New Jersey
Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. N.Y. 1958). See Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup
Bills: Federal Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup Costs, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1761, 1763-64
(1980).
:33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (West Supp. 1964).
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federal government to impose criminal penalties and fines for
discharge of oil into navigable waters.
29
In other words, the federal government has made its bed
and must lie in it. Even though the liability limits were greatly
increased under OPA as compared to past oil spill liability limits
under FWPCA,30 OPA's general compensation scheme is inad-
equate to compensate the federal government in a Valdez-type
oil spill. However, because OPA is a comprehensive scheme,
compensation is only a part of the overall picture. Ideally, had
OPA been in effect at the time of the Valdez spill, the safety
and preventative measures in the bill would have greatly reduced
the magnitude of the spill, and also the need for compensation.
Section V of this note discusses this point in more detail.
III. RECOVERY BY STATE GOVERNMENTS
Though the federal government is foreclosed from utilizing
alternate compensation schemes by the comprehensive nature of
OPA, part of that comprehensive framework declines to preempt
states from "imposing any additional liability."3 Also, OPA
specifically authorizes a claimant (almost any entity other than
the federal government) to proceed against a responsible party
in court as an alternative to proceeding against the OPA fund.1
2
Therefore, recovery by "persons"" other than the federal gov-
ernment, based on legal theories other than those under OPA,
is part of OPA's comprehensive framework, and City of Mil-
waukee would be no barrier to such additional recoveries.
OPA provides recovery for the "total of the liability of a
responsible party ' 3 4 for all the costs and damages specifically
laid out in the Act.3 , As noted earlier, these maximum liability
- For application of this statute to oil spills, see United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225-226 (1966).
" The FWPCA liability limits were $125 per gross ton of the vessel for inland
barges and $150 per gross ton for any other vessel (except where willful conduct allows
full recovery costs). 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(f)(1) (West Supp. 1988). The OPA increases
this to $1200 per gross ton for any "tank vessel" and $600 per gross ton for any other
vessel. OPA § 1004(a)(l) and (2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (a)(l) and (2) (West Supp. 1991).
11 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380 § 1018(a)(1), 104 Stat. 484, 505
(1990), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718 (a)(l) (West Supp. 1991).
2 OPA § 1013(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713 (c) (West Supp. 1991).
1 Section 1013 of the OPA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713 (West Supp. 1991), which sets
out the claims procedure, speaks of "persons" making the claim. "Persons" is defined
in section 1001(27) to include an "individual, corporation, partnership, association,
State, municipality, [and] commission." Also, the OPA specifically authorizes private
court claims at OPA § 1013(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713 (c) (West Supp. 1991).
- OPA § 1004(a), U.S.C.A. § 2704(a) (West Supp. 1991).
I OPA § 1002(b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b) (West Supp. 1991). Liability for a
1991-921
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limits represent figures that are considerably higher than any-
thing contained in past oil spill legislation. 6 However, because
OPA's enumerated recoverable damages are generous, a respon-
sible party's liability limits, though relatively large, can be ex-
hausted relatively quickly. The Valdez spill shows that multiple
claims made by the federal government, state governments, and
private entities can exhaust the entire fund created by OPA.
Therefore, additional routes of recovery are essential to achieve
maximum compensation for all parties.
At least 25 states have either a general water pollution statute
which covers oil spills3 7 or a specific oil spill statute. 8 Almost
all of these statutes impose absolute or strict liability on the
discharger of oil.39 Often, these statutes are coupled with sepa-
rate state oil compensation funds4° that are usually modeled after
the fund created by FWPCA .4  The Valdez spill prompted in-
" OPA § 1002(b), 33 U.S.C.A, § 2702(b) (West Supp. 1991). Liability for a
responsible party includes all removal costs incurred by the United States or any state
or by any private party acting pursuant to the national contingency plan. Additionally,
the statute specifically describes the sorts of damages recoverable. Those damages gen-
erally are: natural resources, real or personal property, subsistence use, revenues, profits
and earning capacity, and public services. See OPA § 1002(2)(A)-(F), 33 U.S.C.A. §
2702(2)(A)-(F) (West Supp. 1991).
36 See supra note 30.
37 ALA. CODE §§ 22-22-1 to 22-22-14 (1990); FLA. StAT. ANN., §§ 376.011 to
376.17, 376.19 to 376.21 (West 1988); HAW. R-Ev. STAT. §§ 342D-50 to 342D-60 (Supp.
1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1701-1706 (1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2071-
2078 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 49-17-1 to 49-17-433 (Supp. 1988);
35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.1 to 691.760.2 (1977 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-
12-1 to 46-12-37 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-510 to 48-43-620 (Law Co-op 1987);
TEX. WATER CODE §§ 26.261 to 26.268 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1991).
" ALASKA STAT. § 46.03, 46.04 and 46.08 (1991); CAL. HARE. & NAy. CODE §§
151-152, 293-294 (1978 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-448 to 22a-453 (1985
& Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-6216 (1983 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-4-1 to 12-4-4 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-560 (1989 & Supp.
1990); MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN. §§ 4-401 to 4-418 (1987); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, §§
1-18 (Law Co-op (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 146A:1-15, 146D:1-9 (1990); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11, 58:10A (1982 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. NAY. LAW §§ 170-197
(Consol. 1989 & Supp 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.75 to 143-215.93, 143-
215,94AA to 143-215.94JJ (1990); OR. Rav. STAT. §§ 468.780 to 468.821 (1989); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:1 to .34:7 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.48.315 to
90.48.390 (1989).
" Note, Spillover from the Exxon Valdez: North Carolina's New Offshore Oil
Spill Statute, 68 N.C.L. REV. 1241, 1226 (Sept. 1990) (citing Hearing on H.R. 1232
Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-282 (1985)).
33 d.
'33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West Supp. 1987). Methods of creating these funds range
[VOL. 7:105
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creased efforts by states to pass oil spill legislation, with at least
two states, within months of the Valdez spill, enacting legislation
specifically aimed at catastrophic oil spills.42
A review of the floor debate on OPA confirms the congres-
sional intent to give states a sort of "free reign." 43 Opinions on
the floor advocated retention of state statutes that would satisfy
states displeased with the job done by the federal government;"
give states a real voice in determining the extent of damages
caused by an oil spill;4 and retain concurrent state and federal
environmental legislation.4 The end result was the creation of a
sort of layering scheme that errs on the side of inclusion rather
than exclusion or preemption. Some inconsistency and duplica-
tion was accepted in exchange for the safety of the layered
approach. Perhaps the single most enunciated reason for non-
preemption was the general theory that it was "tough" on the
oil industry.
4 7
Ultimately, the House reversed a longstanding position fa-
voring preemption and approved a non-preemption amendment
4
with the stated purpose of allowing states to place extra protec-
tion on unique riparian territories. 49 The final version of OPA
even specifically preempted the ancient Limitation of Liability
Act of 1851 (LLA) . LLA had been used by at least two federal
from legislative appropriation, reimbursement from responsible parties, penalties, licens-
ing fees, and excise taxes on oil. Some states have provisions similar to those in the
FWCPA that require proof of financial responsibility for the cargo of oil that is being
transported. 68 N.C.L. REV. at 1226-28 (Sept. 1990).
,1 Act of July 19, 1989, ch. 656, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 222 (Offshore Oil Spill
Act) (codified at N.C. Gen. Stal. §§ 143.215.77 to 143.215.94); Act of July 1, 1989, ch.
112 § l(a), 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 473.
" In past sessions of Congress, the preemption debate was a major sticking point,
with the House typically in favor of preemption and the Senate against it. 48 CoNG. Q.
WEEKLY REPORT 655 (March 3, 1990).
' 135 CoNG. REC. H7961 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Carper).
135 CoNG. REC. H7969 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dyson).
135 CoNG. REC. H8129 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Miller (CA)).
See also Grumbles, Major Provisions: Themes of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 21
ENV'T RrP. (BNA) No. 27, at 1268 (Nov. 2, 1990). State law was not preempted under
the Clean Water Act, the Trans-Atlantic Pipeline Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, or the Deepwater Ports Act. 135 CONG. REC. H8130 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Studds).
135 CONG. REc. H8135 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Maehtley).
By a vote of 279 to 143. 135 CONG. REC. H8148 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989).
135 CONG. REC. H8138 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Studds).
Specific examples given were that Alaska should be allowed to place extra protection on
Prince William Sound just as Florida should be able to shield the Keys.
1 46 U.S.C.A. § 181-96 (West Supp. 1987).
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district courts to limit claims against shipowners brought under
state oil spill statutes. 1 LLA was singled out by OPA such that
it could in no way prevent any state from imposing additional
liability on parties responsible for oil spills.52
The text and legislative history of OPA indicates that Con-
gress wished not only to allow state legislation, but also to
encourage it. As Senator George Mitchell stated on the floor,
OPA should in no way be construed as preempting state law or
blocking the use of state courts53 because, after all, only the
polluters favor preemption.
54
Since the President takes complete control of oil spill clean-
ups, states should have somewhat limited expenditures under
their independent oil spill legislation. However, OPA specifically
provides for reimbursement to the states for any expense in-
curred in cleanup efforts that they make immediately following
a spill, before federal cleanup teams can mobilize." States may
also incur damage to state-owned natural resources. OPA pro-
vides for state claims against the fund and for separate legal
remedies for these sorts of damages by including states in the
definition of "persons.'
'" 6
If federal expenses in a Valdez-type spill exhaust the OPA
fund, state governments, unlike the federal government, can
proceed in court on alternate theories of compensation. This
occurred in the case of Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied
Towing Corp.,7 where an oil-carrying barge sank and released
an unspecified amount of oil into the Chesapeake Bay. The
federal government spent $480,000 in removal of the oil while
the Commonwealth of Virginia spent $41,000. Steuart, the barge's
owner, spent $40,000.8 Steuart's liability under FWPCA was
$122,300 ($100 per gross ton weight of the barge).5 9 The federal
government's recovery was limited to that amount. 0 Virginia,
however, based its claim for reimbursement not on FWPCA,
5' In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. N.Y. 1977); In re Harbor
Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
,z OPA § 1018(c)(l)-(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1990).
135 CONG. REC. § 9692 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
135 CoNG. REc. H7971 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Miller (CA)).
OPA § 1012(d)(1). 33 U.S.C.A. § 2712(d)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
OPA §§ 1013 and 1001(27), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 and 2713 (West Supp. 1990).






but on a state statute which imposed strict liability on responsible
parties. 61 Steuart argued that section 1321(f)(1) of FWPCA 62
limited his liability to the amount set by FWPCA.
The Fourth Circuit allowed recovery by Virginia on two
theories. The most important theory is that federal legislation
could not be construed as superceding state legislation of the
same subject unless there was a clearly manifested congressional
intent to do so.63 In Steuart, no such intent was found. On the
contrary, section 1321(o)(2) of FWPCA6' manifested a clear
intention to allow actions under state laws.63 The Fourth Circuit
stated that the purpose of FWPCA was not to "hobble the states
by subjecting their claims for removal costs to the limitations in
the Pollution Act."66 This rationale has immense importance
under OPA because it allows states to impose unlimited liability
on a responsible party even after that party has paid its full
measure of liability under any federal statutory scheme.
A comparison of the anti-preemption sections of FWPCA
and OPA reveals similarities in language. 67 If anything, the anti-
preemption provisions of OPA are more enthusiastic about al-
lowing and encouraging state oil spill statutes. For instance,
FWPCA states that any state law in conflict with the act will be
preempted, while OPA contains no such language.st Further,
OPA leaves intact state oil removal plans6 and common law
remedies, 70 neither of which is specifically preserved by FWPCA.
Therefore, the Steuart rationale would permit the State of Alaska
l 1973 Va. Acts ch. 417 (formerly VA. CoDE § 62.1-44.34:2).
33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(0(1) (West Supp. 1978).
6 Steuart, 596 F.2d at 620 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
157-58 (1978)).
- 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(o)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
Steuart, 596 F.2d at 620.
- Id. In fact, the House conference report on § 1321(o)(2) specifically explained
that a state could impose "additional requirements and penalties" on the responsible
party for an oil spill. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-940, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970).
- FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(o)(2), reads: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed as preempting any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any
requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil or hazardous substance into
any waters within such State." Compare OPA § 10l8(a)(l)(A): "Nothing in this
Act ... shall affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any
State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or require-
ments with respect to the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State."
" Id.
- OPA § 1018(a)(l)(B), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1990).
70 OPA § 1018(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990).
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to proceed against Exxon under OPA, just as Virginia proceeded
against Steuart under FWPCA. Such a suit would be allowed
regardless of whether Exxon had already satisfied its liability
limits under OPA.
One of the bases of the Steuart decision was Askew v.
American Waterways Operators Inc. 71 In Askew, the Supreme
Court upheld Florida's unlimited oil spill liability statute. 72 The
constitutional challenge claimed that the statute contradicted
existing federal legislation. In rejecting that challenge, the Court
ruled that "[i]f Florida wants to take the lead in cleaning up oil
spillage in her waters, she can use § 12 of the Florida Act and
recoup her costs from those who did the damage. '"'7 The Court
left open the question later answered by Steuart: whether a
state's recovery is subject to dollar limits under the then-newly-
enacted FWPCA, other federal statutes, or general federal mar-
itime law.
The constitutional question presented in Askew was whether
states may exercise their police powers in a field where the
Constitution grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over ad-
miralty and maritime claims. 74 The challenge was rejected on the
basis that "a State may modify or supplement maritime law...
provided the state action is not hostile 'to the characteristic
features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legis-
lation.' '7 Since neither of these conditions existed, the state
legislation was upheld.
Reading Askew together with Steuart leads to the conclusion
that states are "virtually free to establish their own oil spill
liability and cleanup regimes without fear of preemption by
existing federal law." ' 76 Other commentators have drawn a dif-
"- 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
7 The statute in question, codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.011 to 376.21 (West
1987), at the time of the decision imposed liability without limit for oil spill cleanup
costs and both public and private damages.
"1 Askew, 411 U.S. at 332. The applicable federal legislation was the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, then codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1161 (West Supp. 1970) and
later amended by the FWPCA. The Court referred to § 1321(o) of the Act to support
its proposition. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for favorable comparison of
this section to the language of the OPA.
" U.S. CoNsT. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1. The appellants based their challenge on a line
of Supreme Court cases ruling that maritime workers could not constitutionally receive
worker's compensation awards under New York law because the remedy in admiralty
was exclusive. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)-
" Askew, 411 U.S. at 338 (citing Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941)).
,6 Note, supra note 39.
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ferent conclusion from International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,77
but such contrary conclusions cannot be drawn under OPA. In
Ouellette, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
FWPCA preempted a nuisance suit filed under Vermont com-
mon law. The defendant, who was discharging pollution from
outside the borders of Vermont, argued that FWPCA preempted
any action based on Vermont common law. The Court ruled
that a state common law claim could be heard concerning water
pollution of the type regulated by FWPCA, but the law of the
state of the source of the pollution was the applicable law."'
Commentators have suggested that Ouellette limits the ability
of states to bring causes of action for oil spill damages79 because
the case turns on the Court's concern about undermining the
"carefully drawn" discharge standards of the FWPCA as they
relate to industrial pollution.80 The Court reasoned that if state
courts were permitted to create their own discharge standards in
the name of state common law, chaos would reign.8
The Ouellette case is inapplicable under OPA because there
is no danger of undermining carefully drawn standards. The
only standard that could be undermined is the standard for the
adequacy of the cleanup, and that decision was expressly taken
out of the hands of the states."3 Since the main basis of the
decision would not exist under OPA's scheme for handling oil
spills, Ouellette cannot be used to limit the use of common law
and statutory remedies by the states to obtain additional com-
pensation.8 3
IV. RECOVERY BY PRIVATE ENTITIES
In a Valdez-type spill there is a significant amount of damage
to private entities. 84 It is the private claims that can quickly add
- 479 U.S. 481 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see Note, Federal Oil Spill
Legislation: A Future Standard, 53 ALa. L. Ray. 161, 172 (1988). This note argues that
Ouellette construes the FWPCA to preempt all state causes of action except those
"specifically preserved by the Act."
7 Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 487.
7" Note, Federal Oil Spill Legislation: A Future Standard, 53 ALB. L. REv. 161
(1988).
w Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492-494. The specific pollution involved in the case was
the discharge of a variety of effluents by International Paper Company into Lake
Champlain. Id. at 483-84.
SId. at 496-497.
82 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Ouellette is also distinguishable on the grounds that it was not the State of
Vermont which brought the suit, but a group of Vermont landowners. 479 U.S. at 484.
- One month after the Valdez spill, there were over 1300 claims made against
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up to exceed the fund's one billion dollar spending limit.8 5 There-
fore, for private entities to recover beyond the trust fund limit,
as well as beyond the limit of liability placed on the responsible
party, private suits for damages must be initiated. 6 Against the
backdrop of OPA, problems that have plagued private entity
claimants in the past will no longer exist. For example, one suit
brought by the Wildlife Federation of Alaska and the National
Resources Defense Council 7 raised claims of public nuisance,
negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and injuries from ab-
normally dangerous activities. The suit was brought, however,
without alleging that any property rights of the organization or
its members had been affected.88 This created standing problems
for the plaintiffs.
A similar suit went to judgment on February 8, 1991, styled
In re the Exxon Valdez."9 The defendants there contended that
all claims should be dismissed which did not list a specific
physical injury to person or property. Again, standing problems
were apparent and the Federal District Court of Alaska (DCA)
dismissed certain plaintiffs in accord with defendants' motion
for dismissal because of a lack of any claim of economic loss.
Had the above suits been initiated while OPA was in effect, the
plaintiffs would not have been dismissed because, unlike the
DCA, a court operating under OPA would not be forced to
apply past case law requiring a tangible "physical harm."
The DCA put plaintiffs into three classes: 1) area businesses,
such as charters, taxidermists, and sport fishing lodges-not
including commercial fishermen; 2) individuals with use and
enjoyment claims, such as sport fishermen and photographers;
and 3) fish processors and fish tenders. 90 The plaintiffs were
required to show physical harm because the DCA construed the
various claims by the plaintiffs not according to state common
law, but in the light of the general federal maritime law.91 The
Exxon. Comment, The Public as Plaintiff. Public Nuisance and Federal Citizen Suits in
the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 511, n. 1 (1990).
1, The trust fund is created and its limits are set out in 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (West
Supp. 1991).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
'7 The suit was brought in state court and styled National Wildlife Fed'n v. Exxon
Corp., No. 3AN-89-2533 (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 17, 1989).
Comment, supra note 84, at 512.
767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991).
10 Id. at 1511 (D. Alaska 1991).
I1 d. at 1513-1514. The federal maritime law is developed and declared by the
Supreme Court as modified from time to time by acts of Congress.
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rationale for application of federal maritime law was to preserve
uniformity: "[M]aritime law must be applied to torts cognizable
under admiralty jurisdiction regardless of how plaintiffs char-
acterize the tort under common law." 92 Therefore, it did not
matter that plaintiffs characterized their claims in terms of state
law because federal maritime law controlled. 9
As a result of this recharacterization, the DCA concluded
that the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs constituted a classic
maritime tort. The elements of such a tort are that the wrong
occur on the high seas or in navigable waters (called the locality
nexus) and that the wrong bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity (called the maritime nexus).94 The
concept of a maritime tort was expanded by the Admiralty
Extension Act95 to apply to claims of damages that occurred on
land. Therefore, claims of all plaintiffs in In re Exxon were
characterized as maritime torts.
Since the DCA concluded that general maritime law was
controlling and that the injuries claimed were maritime torts, it
was compelled to apply the rule of Robins Dry Dock & Repair
Co. v. Flint.96 That rule provides that where a plaintiff claims
no physical harm, the plaintiff cannot independently recover
either for the loss of financial benefits of prospective trade or
in contract.Y Courts have used this rule to deny the claims of
shoreside businesses for purely economic losses, such as those
claimed by the plaintiffs in In re Exxon.9
The DCA, however, attempted to mitigate the harsh effects
of the Robins rule by recognizing that Congress had enacted
Id. at 1514 (citing Hall v. Zambelli, 675 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (S.D. W.Va.
1988)). Uniformity is the justification for exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction.
03 In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1514 (citing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406, 409 (1953)); see Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 318 n. 7 (1960).
" East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 863-
864 (1986) (locality nexus); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268
(1972) (maritime nexus).
" 46 U.S.C.A. § 740 (West Supp. 1991) reads: "The admiralty and maritime
jurisdicton of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damages or
injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
275 U.S. 303 (1927).
In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1511 (citing Getty Refining & Marketing Co. v.
MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1985)).
" In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1514; see Global Petroleum Corp. v. Northeast
Petroleum, 405 Mass. 187, 539 N.E.2d 1022, 1024 (1989); Palumbo v. Boston Tow Boat
Co., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 414, 487 N.E.2d 546, 549 (1986).
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specific legislation pertaining to trans-Alaska pipeline oil in the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA)." Since TA-
PAA is specific federal maritime legislation, it displaces general
maritime law including the rule from the Robins case.
This conclusion was originally drawn by DCA in In re Gla-
cier Bay,100 where the court squarely addressed the issue of
whether TAPAA preempted all applicable maritime law. The
DCA construed the opening phrase of section 1653(c)(1) of
TAPAA, "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,"
to mean that section 1653 (the liability for damages section of
the Act) was not to be modified by any preexisting law, whatever
its source.'0 ' This "notwithstanding" clause has been construed
identically in the context of FWPCA.102 The result of the Glacier
Bay construction of the "notwithstanding" clause was that to
the extent of liability under TAPAA,1 3 plaintiffs were not con-
strained by the rule in Robins.
However, Alaska and many other states'04 have enacted sta-
tutes that, unlike TAPAA, place unlimited strict liability on a
spiller of oil. Alaska enables plaintiffs to recover beyond federal
statutory limits. 0 5 The Alaska legislation also contains a "not-
- 43 U.S.C.A. § 1651-1655 (West Supp. 1986).
1w In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1515; see In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379
(D. Alaska 1990).
,o 746 F. Supp. at 1384. The full text of TAPAA § 1653(c)(1) reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, if oil that has been
transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline is loaded on a vessel at the
terminal facilities of the pipeline, the owner and operator of the vessel
(jointly and severally) and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund estab-
fished by this subsection, shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in
accordance with the provisions of this subsection for all damages, including
clean-up costs, sustained by any person or entity, public or private, in-
cluding residents of Canada, as the result of discharges of oil from such
vessel.
10 In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 340 (2d Cir. 1981) ("notwithstanding"
clause in the FWPCA is not a preservation of preexisting bases of recovery in non-
statutory maritime law).
-W 43 U.S.C.A. § 1653(c)(3) (West Supp. 1986). The TAPAA provides for strict
liability up to $100 million.
I- See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
'0, ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (Michie Supp. 1990) provides for strict liability for
any oil spills, including oil that has been transported through the trans-Alaska pipeline.
The Court here found this sort of legislation to be a valid exercise of the state's police
power. In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1514 (relying on Murphy v. Amoco Production
Co., 729 F.2d 552, 555-556 (8th Cir. 1984) and Askew v. American waterways Operators,




withstanding" clause, 1' 6 but the DCA ruled that a state "not-
withstanding" clause could not be interpreted to conflict with
federal maritime law. Conflict was apparent to the DCA, which
construed the Alaska provisions as "redefining the requirements
or limits of a remedy available at admiralty.'"°7 As a result, the
DCA reluctantly concluded that the rule of Robins applied.10m
OPA, on the other hand, can be interpreted such that Robins
would not apply. Since OPA, like TAPAA and FWPCA, has a
"notwithstanding" clause,'0 all claimants, including those claim-
ing non-physical injuries, could recover up to the full limit of
liability under OPA. This is consistent with In re Glacier Bay
where such clauses allow recovery of all damages set out by the
statute accorded to any person specified in the statute." 0
The DCA sought a way out of its decision in In re Exxon
by searching for language in TAPAA "which could be inter-
preted as relieving the states from the limits imposed by maritime
law.""' The DCA reasoned that Congress could not authorize
the states to create separate compensation schemes because such
authorization would defeat the very purpose of the constitutional
grant of exclusive maritime jurisdiction. ' 2 However, Congress
could -have allowed the states to simply extend the strict liability
limitation of TAPAA without subjecting those higher limits to
scrutiny under the Robins rule, but "Congress did not specifi-
cally do so.""'
Therefore, what the DCA envisioned as acceptable was a
congressionally created "compensation act" covering all the de-
tails regarding compensable claims and compensable parties.
Under such an act, Congress could leave to the states the au-
thority to raise the liability limits as they see fit. If this were
,m ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.822(a) (Michie Supp. 1990).
1w In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1515 (citing Powell v. Offshore Navigation, Inc.,
644 F.2d 1063, 1065 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 972 (1981)).
, In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1517.
OPA § 1002(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (West Supp. 1991).
110 746 F. Supp. at 1386; see supra note 33 and accompanying text where the OPA
allows recovery by "persons." TAPAA was similarly construed.
SIn re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1515. The closest that TAPAA comes is §
1653(c)(9), which states, "This subsection shall not be interpreted to preempt the field
of strict liability or to preclude any State from imposing additional requirements."
12 In reExron, 767 F. Supp. at 1515-1516, (citing Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920)).
" In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1516, n.7.
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done, then there would be no concern over the Robins rule. 114
The bottom line is that shoreside claimants could recover under
state statutory and state common law theories for non-physical
damages from oil spills.
OPA has done exactly what the DCA deemed acceptable.
The specific scheme of what is compensable and to whom dam-
ages can be paid is set out extensively.' OPA then specifically
authorizes the states to legislate beyond OPA's limits." 6 In fact,
OPA uses the type of wording that the DCA hypothesized as
being adequate to correct the end result reached in In re Exxon.
The DCA objected to TAPAA's section 1653(c)(3) wording that
"[sitrict liability .. . shall not exceed $100,000,000." Instead,
the DCA reasoned that its outcome would have been different
had the language read "only $100,000,000 would be collected
by the fund.' 17 In other words, the DCA looked for TAPAA
to state that the liability limits applied only to liability under
TAPAA and not to liability in the whole of oil spill law. OPA
section 1004, on the other hand, reads "the total of the liability
of a responsible party under section 1002"11 and thus avoids
what is objectionable about TAPAA; that is, the phraseology
of "the total of the liability of a responsible party shall not
exceed ...
Therefore, instead of limiting strict liability in general and,
according to the DCA's reading, thereby limiting it for the entire
field of maritime law, OPA merely limits liability under its own
section 1002. This leaves the door open to additional liabilities
from other statutory authority. As a result, if suits such as In
re Exxon were brought while OPA governed oil spill liability,
private suits for damages above and beyond the limits of OPA
"' This conclusion finds support in the Askew ruling which states that "la]t least
in the absence of explicit congressional authorization, we shall not extend the historic
boundaries of the maritime law." 411 U.S. at 340-341 (citing Victory Carriers, Inc. v.
Law, 404 U.S. 202, 214 (1971)). Presumably then, the Supreme Court would uphold an
extension of maritime law if explicitly authorized by Congress even if such authorization
includes the states in the scheme to extend the historic boundaries.
"' See supra note 35 and accompanying text for what is compensable, and supra
note 33 and accompanying text for who can collect such damages.
"1 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
In re Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1516, n.7.
OPA §1004(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704 (a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
The text of § 1004(a) states: "(a) General Rule-Except as otherwise provided in this
section, the total of the liablility of a responsible party under section 1002 and any
removal costs incurred by, or on behalf of, the responsible party, with respect to each
incident shall not exceed-[the following enumerated limits]."
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would not be subject to the Robins rule. Private suits would
also not be subject to any other "general" federal maritime laws
because OPA precisely lays out the extent of the damages that
are recoverable from a party responsible for an oil spill."19
The only other case arising from the Valdez spill to go to
decision, as of this writing, would also have been decided dif-
ferently under OPA. In Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.,' ° the Federal
District Court for the Central District of California (DCC) dis-
missed claims similar to those in In re Exxon. The rationale of
the DCC, contrary to that used by the DCA, was that TAPAA
was enacted "against a backdrop of well established maritime
law," including the rule in Robins, and therefore Congress must
be deemed to have incorporated these rules into TAPAA.' 2 ' For
authority, the DCC cited the Supreme Court case of Edmonds
v. Compagnie Generale Transatiantique.1'"
The ruling in Edmonds was that the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972
(LHWCAA) did not override the traditional admiralty rules
concerning shipowner liability.123 The Court reasoned that since
"[tihe reports and debates leading up to the 1972 Amendments
contain not a word of this concept," the concept of modifying
the longstanding rights of action against negligent vessels,'2 such
modification must not have been contemplated.
Unlike the floor debate for LHWCAA, when enacting OPA
Congress was far from silent about the comprehensive and all-
encompassing nature of OPA. 125 Therefore, the rationale of Ed-
monds would not apply to the enactment of OPA, and it is
doubtful that the DCC could or would reach the same result
under OPA without Edmonds for authority.
If OPA is interpreted as above, private entities would be
given a chance for maximum recovery without the need for suits
" See OPA § 1002, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West Supp. 1991). Since Robins would
not apply in this scenario, the portion of the In re Exxon opinion concerning the inroads
made into the Robins rule and calling for its reconsideration by the Ninth Circuit is
immaterial to this discussion.
No. CV 90 2184 RG, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251 (filed July 27, 1990).
2 Id. at 3.
122 443 U.S. 256 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 889 (1979).
Id. at 266.
, Id. at 266-67. The court continues, stating that "[tihis silence is most eloquent,
for such reticence while contemplating an important and controversial change in existing
law is unlikely." Id.
M See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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such as Chenega Bay v. Lujan.12 That case involved a group of
5,000 residents of native Alaskan villages bringing suit against
officials of the federal government, the State of Alaska, Exxon
Corp., Exxon Shipping Co., and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
The plaintiffs brought suit solely to enjoin the defendants from
consummating a settlement concerning damages from the Valdez
spill, because they feared that settlement would impair their
ability to seek relief in suits already pending.' 27 The Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the action
and avoided a probable legal tangle by having the parties stip-
ulate that "the plaintiffs will be able to prosecute fully the suits
they have initiated against Exxon and Alyeska just as if no
settlement agreement existed." '2
Though barriers to private recovery no longer exist under
OPA, one of the biggest recurring problems in any environmen-
tal liability legislation still exists: the question of valuation of
damaged and destroyed natural resources. Unlike cleanup costs
which are easily quantified, damages to waterfowl or pristine
coastal lands are quite difficult to price.
Federal courts have attempted to supply general guidance in
this area. The recent high-impact ruling of Ohio v. United States
Dep't of the Interior is an example) 29 In this litigation, the D.C.
Circuit overturned aspects of the Department of the Interior's
(DOI) valuation regulations as they applied to natural resources.
The court ruled that DOI could no longer measure damages to
natural resources as the lesser of the diminution in use value or
the restoration cost, but must instead measure damages at least
at the level of restoration costs.
30
From an examination of the floor debate regarding OPA, it
is clear that Congress endeavored to make the statute consistent
Nos. 91-483 SS, and 91-484 SS, 1991 LEXIS 2986 (filed March 12, 1991).
,' Id. at 2. The settlement agreement between the federal and state government
and the corporations concerned reparation for natural resource damages. Plaintiffs'
claims for damages against the same corporations were pending in federal and state
courts of Alaska.
''Id.
880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh'g denied en banc, 897 F.2d 1151 (1989), and
its companion case of Colorado v. United States Dep't of Interior. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
11 Ohio, 880 F.2d at 448 ("§ 107(0(1) of CERCLA evinces a clear congressional
intent to make restoration costs the basic measure of damages."). The logic of this
interpretation seems clear because, as the Court stated, "It would be odd indeed for a
Congress so insistent that all damages be spent on restoration to allow a 'lesser' measure
of damages than the cost of restoration in the majority of cases." Id. at 445.
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with the Ohio ruling.13" ' But reliance on that case is of only
limited benefit in an oil spill situation, because there the court
dealt only with valuation regulations promulgated pursuant to
CERCLA,3 2 and CERCLA specifically excludes oil spills from
its scope.'
OPA settled on typical "measure of damages" language
13 4
coupled with the spirit of the Ohio decision, which has been
described as requiring recovery for devastation wrought on "fish
and otter plying the streams and seas, birds on the wing, and
teeming wildlife of the meadows and forests."' 35 But the question
remains under OPA: How can these things be valued?
States have been struggling with the same question. The most
prevalent approach is to assess a replacement cost based on the
market cost to acquire new resources. 3 6 Of course, a major
limitation on this method is that for resources without any sort
of commercial availability there is no reasonable valuation.",
Attempted valuations have lead to absurd results as in Puerto
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni,38 where natural resource damages
from an oil spill were determined by the cost of replacement of
those resources from a biological supply catalog. 3 9 Other states
"I See references to the Ohio decision in floor debate at 135 CoNr. REC. S9692
(daily ed. Aug 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 135 CoNo. REc. H7957 (daily ed.
Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Studds) (The measure of damages shall include
"restoration costs" and compensation for "reliably calculated use values" and "other
factors in addition to use values."); Id. at H7965 (statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt);
Id. at H7966 (statement of Rep. Stangeland).
-2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West Supp. 1990).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (West Supp. 1990).
OPA § 1006(d), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2076(d) (West Supp. 1991). The relevant language
of OPA § 1006 is:
(d) MEASURE OF DAMAGES-
(I) IN GENERAL-The measure of natural resource damages under section
1002(b)(2)(A) is-
(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of,
the damaged natural resources;
(B) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration; plus
(C) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.
" Natural Resource Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and Colorado Decisions:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 12, at 10551
(December 1989).
"3 Schenke, Liability for Damages Arising From an Oil Spill, 4 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 14, 53 (Spring 1990).
13i Id.
- 628 F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
"I Id. at 677. The court struck down this scheme as an impractical plan.
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use liquidated damages or statutory civil penalties; however, such
approaches have no relation to the specific impact of the oil
spill involved.'"
The bottom line may be that this is an unanswerable ques-
tion-at least in a completely satisfactory manner. Perhaps in
recognition of this, OPA contains a provision that requires the
President, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere, to "promulgate regulations for the
assessment of natural resource damages . . . resulting from a
discharge of oil" within two years of August 18, 1990.' 1 This
section of OPA was a graceful way for Congress to avoid
tackling a tough issue head-on. It is hoped the issue will be
resolved in such a manner that in the event of other oil spills,
natural resource damage assessments will be proportionate to
the true value of the resource damaged.
V. THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
Even if private entities and states get their full damage
recovery under state statutes and state and federal common law,
there are still the cleanup costs incurred by the federal
government' 42 of two billion dollars.' 4 Only if the federal gov-
ernment proves gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a vio-
lation of any applicable federal safety, construction, or operating
regulation can it recover the full cleanup cost from the respon-
sible party." Otherwise, the maximum that Exxon would have
to pay to the federal government is $114,202,800.'14 This means
the federal government must bear the burden of the remaining
$1,885,797,200, with only $1,000,000,000 available from the oil
spill trust fund to cover that amount. The result is that the OPA
fund would be completely depleted and the federal government
would still pay out $885,797,200 in cleanup costs. Ideally, how-
,, See Schenke, supra note 136. at 54 (though these methods do have the advantage
of being quick).
OPA § 1006(e)(l), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2706(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
', See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note I I and accompanying text.
OPA § 1004(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991). The act also
allows for full recovery if the responsible party does not report the spill or does not
provide all reasonable cooperation with the government in connection with the removal
operation. OPA § 1004(c)(2), 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
"I Based on the gross tonnage of the Valdez being 95,169 gross tons multiplied by
$1200 per gross ton. Gross tonnage figure taken from 53 ALB. L. REV. 161 at 209 (1988).
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ever, had OPA been in existence before the Valdez took that
trip through Prince William Sound, that spill might not have
occurred, or at least it might have been significantly contained.
This is because of the extensive oil removal and spill prevention
provisions contained in OPA.
Perhaps the most important cleanup provision in OPA is the
one that creates a national oil spill response system. This system
sets up eight regional oil spill response teams, each with an area
contingency plan. '" The teams are under the control of the Coast
Guard, and each team acts under its own individual plan and in
coordination with the National Response Unit-the headquarters
for all oil spill response teams.' 4 7 Congress made it clear in floor
debate that these response teams will train for, and be prepared
to deal with, worst-case oil spills. 4 It was also expressed on the
floor that the contingency plans should be "rational and work-
able," and to insure this, OPA requires the appropriate govern-
mental officials to sign the plans to signify their express
approval. 149
If the response teams had been in place before the Valdez
spill and the federal government had been in sole control of the
situation,5 0 the immediate cleanup in Prince William Sound
might not have been an "unreasonably slow, confused, and
inadequate response.""'  It follows that the ultimate costs of
removal could have been significantly lower.
In addition to setting up a system of response teams, OPA
also contains a plethora of preventative measures. One of the
simplest, yet one that could have prevented the Valdez spill
altogether, deals with merchant marine licensing. Specifically,
OPA makes the issuance of a license contingent on a review of
the driving record and criminal record of the applicant." 2 OPA
also allows for drug and alcohol testing of applicants and rev-
OPA § 4202(a)(6), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(j)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
,47 OPA § 4202(a)(6), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(j)(2) (West Supp. 1991). This section
provides that the National Response Unit maintain computer facilities to monitor spill
removal resources and personnel and equipment that is available worldwide and coor-
dinate the use of such public and private personnel and equipment.
10 135 Co4o. REc. H7963 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Anderson).
,,9 135 CoNo. Rac. H8253 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Sikorski).
A prior version of the bill allowed for passive approval of contingency plans by providing
that they could be approved "if not rejected" by the appropriate officials.
' As is the case under OPA § 4201(a), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(c) (West Supp. 1991).
135 CoNc. Rac. S9690 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
"' OPA § 4101(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 7101 (g), (h) (West Supp. 1991).
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ocation or suspension of licenses based on drug or alcohol use. 153
These provisions apply to both applicants and current license
holders. 1
54
Had this regulation been in effect prior to the Valdez spill,
the pilot most likely would not have held a license to operate
the ship. If the Valdez captain, as was widely believed, was a
continuing threat due to his alcohol abuse,' he certainly would
have had his license revoked under OPA's standards. Presuma-
bly then, a competent captain would have been aboard the
Valdez, and the ship would never have run aground on Bligh
Reef.'
56
Another preventative measure in OPA that could have com-
pletely prevented any oil spill is the implementation of area-
specific safety requirements. These requirements apply to envi-
ronmentally fragile areas, or areas that are hazardous to navi-
gate, and include provisions for Prince William Sound.5 7 The
safety requirements designate when and where a vessel must be
piloted by a properly licensed pilot.""8 In the case of Prince
William Sound, it requires the implementation of a vessel traffic
control system.5 9
OPA also contains many provisions aimed at improving the
safety of oil tankers and the effectiveness of cleanup procedures.
Oil tanker safety is mainly addressed in a double hull require-
ment mandating that all new tankers have double hulls and that
all old tankers be retro-fitted according to a complex schedule
which has most tankers with double hulls by the year 2015.160
1 OPA § 4103(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 7702(c), (d) (West Supp. 1991); OPA § 4103(b),
46 U.S.C.A. § 7703 (West Supp. 1991).
1 OPA § 4103(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 7702(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991); OPA § 4103 (b),
46 U.S.C.A. § 7703 (West Supp. 1991).
I Oil Spill Indictment, 76 A.B.A.J. 28 (July 1990).
11 Id. The Valdez's captain, Joseph Hazelwood, was convicted of negligently
discharging oil, a misdemeanor, but was acquitted of three major charges, including the
reckless operation of a tanker while intoxicated.
157 OPA §§ 5001-5007, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2731-2727 (West Supp. 1991). Other areas
receiving special attention included the Strait of Juan De Fuca (between Washington
State and Vancouver Island), OPA § 4116(c), 46 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (West Supp. 1991);
and the Great Lakes, OPA § 4108(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 9302(b) (West Supp. 1991).
OPA § 4116(a), 46 U.S.C.A. § 8502(g) (West Supp. 1991).
" OPA § 5003, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2733 (West Supp. 1991) (directing the Secretary of
Transportation to install a navigation light at Bligh Reef); OPA § 5004, 33 U.S.C.A. §
2734 (West Supp. 1991) (establishing vessel traffic service system).
1 OPA § 4115, 46 U.S.C.A. § 3703(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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Requirements for stepped up efforts in research and devel-
opment of oil cleanup technologies has its own title in OPA,
evidencing that it was a major concern of Congress.' 6 1 The floor
debate revealed that both government and industry had greatly
relaxed research and development efforts in this area, and that
the only oil spill technology testing facility was shut down in
1986.162 Because of this, research and development was a per-
vasive topic in floor debate as well as throughout OPA itself.
Increased research and development, along With the double hull
requirement, will take some years to have an impact on oil spill
prevention and removal. But once that effect is felt, it should
substantially improve our nation's preparedness for oil tanker
accidents.
VI. CONCLUSION
OPA was not an attempt by Congress to fully codify every
possible compensation scheme for oil spill damages. However,
for the federal government, OPA is the exclusive remedy. There-
fore, the maximum that the federal government can collect from
a party responsible for an oil spill is the amount of monetary
liability OPA'places on that party, plus the amount contained
in the oil spill liability fund. To decrease the chance that the
federal government would go uncompensated for a large cleanup
expenditure, OPA contains measures designed to completely pre-
vent, or at least to minimize, the damages caused by an oil spill.
States can enact legislation that goes further than the liability
limits of OPA. Congress specifically contemplated this and chose
to allow it as part of a comprehensive oil spill liability scheme.
As a result, states can recover according to the terms of their
individual statutes, even going so far as to impose unlimited
liability on a party responsible for an oil spill.
Private entities can also use the state statutes to recover
damages beyond the liability limits of OPA. Even those private
entities that have non-physical shoreside damages are not barred
from asserting a cause of action.
1-1OPA § 2761, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2761 (West Supp. 1991) (establishing an oil pollution
research and development program).
1 135 CoNc. REc. H7970 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Scheuer);
id. at H7969 (statement of Rep. Schneider); 135 CoNo. REc. S9691 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee); 135 CONo. REc. S10076 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Stevens).
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Construing OPA as suggested by this note maximizes recov-
ery for damages and also maximizes safety in the transportation
of oil. A possible barrier to such an outcome is the lack of a
proper scheme for the valuation of natural resources damaged
by oil spills. Such a scheme must be created to ensure that OPA
achieves its objectives of full compensation and maximum safety.
By examining the possible avenues that the federal govern-
ment, state governments, and private entities may take to seek
compensation, this note has sought to answer the question of
whether compensation under OPA for a catastrophic oil spill is
adequate. The conclusion that should be drawn, at least regard-
ing states and private entities, is that compensation can indeed
be adequate because OPA does not provide an exclusive remedy.
Instead, states and private entities can look to state-based recov-
ery laws and use them vigorously. OPA has left this avenue
open, and it is that course that leads to adequate compensation
for damages sustained in a catastrophic oil spill.
Patrick Nash
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